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WARNING 
ALTHOUGH EVERY EFFORT HAS GENERALLY BEEN MADE TO INCORPORATE SAFETY 
FEATURES INTO DESIGN, IT IS OFTEN NECESSARY TO RELY ON PROCEDURES AND 
TRAINING TO MITIGATE SITUATIONS THAT CAN PRODUCE HAZARDS. SAFETY IS, 
THEREFORE, HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON ADEQUATE TRAINING AND PROCEDURES. 
INADEQUATE TRAINING OR PROCEDURES OR FAILURE TO STRICTLY ADHERE TO 
TRAINING AND PROCEDURES CAN LEAD TO SEVERE INJURIES OR DEATH. 
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1. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this analysis is to systematically identify and evaluate fire hazards related to the 
Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project (YMP) Enhanced Characterization of the 
Repository Block (ECRB) East-West Cross Drift (commonly referred to as the ECRB Cross-
Drift). This analysis builds upon prior Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) System Safety 
Analyses and incorporates Topopah Springs (TS) Main Drift fire scenarios and ECRB Cross-
Drift fire scenarios. Accident scenarios involving the fires in the Main Drift and the ECRB 
Cross-Drift were previously evaluated in Topopah Springs Main Drift System Safety Analysis 
(CRWMS M&O 1995) and the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project East-West Drift 
System Safety Analysis (CRWMS M&O 1998). In addition to listing required mitigation/control 
features, this analysis identifies the potential need for procedures and training as part of defense-
in-depth mitigation/control features. The inclusion of this information in the System Safety 
Analysis (SSA) is intended to assist the organization(s) (e.g., Construction, Environmental 
Safety and Health, Design) responsible for these aspects of the ECRB Cross-Drift in developing 
mitigation/control features for fire events, including Emergency Refuge Station(s). This SSA 
was prepared, in part, in response to Condition/Issue Identification and Reporting/Resolution 
System (CIRS) item 1966. 
The SSA is an integral part of the systems engineering process, whereby safety is considered 
during planning, design, testing, and construction. A largely qualitative approach is used which 
incorporates operating experiences and recommendations from vendors, the constructor and the 
operating contractor. The risk assessment in this analysis characterizes the scenarios associated 
with fires in terms of relative risk and includes recommendations for mitigating all identified 
hazards. The priority for recommending and implementing mitigation control features is: 
• Incorporate measures to reduce risks and hazards into Structure, System, or Component 
(SSC) designs 
• Add safety features and capabilities to existing designs 
• Develop procedures and conduct training to increase worker awareness of potential 
hazards, reduce exposure to hazards, and inform personnel of the actions required to 
avoid accidents or correct hazardous conditions. 
2. QUALITY ASSURANCE 
This SSA was prepared in accordance with YAP-30.48, System Safety Analysis, and other 
procedures invoked by YAP-30.48. This work scope is identified in the Technical Work Plan 
For: Preclosure Safety Analysis (BSC 2001b). 
3. METHOD 
The safety/risk assessment methodology used in this analysis is documented in procedure YAP-
30.48, System Safety Analysis. The result of the analysis is a "risk evaluation" of the scenarios or 
hazards identified in this analysis in accordance with Military System Safety Program 
Requirements (DOD 1993). Three steps are required to complete the risk evaluation: 
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(1) hazard/scenario identification, (2) frequency assessment, and (3) consequence assessment. 
The word "accident" as used in this analysis refers to events, breakdowns, incidents, or any other 
occurrence that may have a negative effect on personnel safety. 
3.1 HAZARD SCENARIO IDENTIFICATION 
The first step of the risk assessment process involves the identification of possible accident 
scenarios that can have negative consequences for the ESF personnel or facilities. It is important 
to provide assurance that potentially significant scenarios have been considered and the 
consequences are appropriately mitigated through design selection, safety design features or 
devices, detection and warning devices, and/or use of procedures and training. 
3.2 FREQUENCY ASSESSMENT 
In general, bounding frequency estimates are developed for the accident scenarios and system 
failures. The frequency rating scale documented in YAP-30.48 contains five levels of estimated 
frequency. The frequency levels are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Frequency Rating Scale 
Frequency Description 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
Frequent 
Probable 
Occasional 
Remote 
Improbable 
Likely to occur frequently 
Will occur several times in the life of an SSC 
Likely to occur some time in the life of an SSC 
Unlikely but possible to occur in the life of an SSC 
So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be 
experienced 
3.3 CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT 
The potential range of consequences, from minor health effects to injury and/or fatality, is 
determined by using a consequence rating scale, which is also documented in YAP-30.48. The 
rating scale and definitions are presented in Table 2. The consequence rating scale also 
addresses potential impacts to site characterization data ranging from no loss of data to an 
irretrievable loss of license application data. The determination of consequence for each 
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scenario, like the frequency estimate, was based on engineering experience and judgment and 
historical operating data. 
Table 2. Consequence Rating and Definition 
Consequence Level Maximum Consequence 
I Catastrophic 
II Critical 
III Marginal 
Death, system/equipment loss, or severe 
environmental impact 
Severe injury or illness, major system/equipment or 
environmental damage 
Minor injury or illness, minor system/equipment 
damage, minor delay of data collection or loss of 
data 
IV Negligible Less than minor injury, occupational illness, or 
system damage 
3.4 RISK ASSESSMENT 
Risk is a function of frequency and consequence. The level of risk is determined by assigning a 
qualitative rating (high, medium, low, extremely low) to each of the frequency and consequence 
combinations. By determining the frequency of occurrence and level of consequence for each 
scenario, the risk classification for each scenario is determined by using the risk matrix in 
Figure 1. Within each risk category there is a precedence, based on consequence and frequency. 
For example, a scenario with a frequency of Frequent and a consequence level of Catastrophic 
has a higher risk than a scenario with a frequency of Frequent and a consequence level of 
Critical. 
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Figure 1 Risk Matrix 
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Since the levels of risk are largely subjective, the risk designations must be viewed as relative. 
Relative risks are useful for determining the order in which risks are addressed; they are not 
absolute measures. Absolute nsk is used when sufficient histoncal operating data is available on 
the same design as is currently being utilized and under the same operating conditions. 
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Nonetheless, relative risk can be used as a management tool, especially when mitigation features 
have not been established and/or verified. 
4. CODES, STANDARDS, AND REFERENCES 
4.1 DOCUMENTS CITED 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2001a. Calculation of ECRB Cross-Drift Worst-Case Fire and 
Effects. BAB000000-01717-0210-00001REV00. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC 
Company. ACC: MOL.20011206.0227. 
BSC 2001b. Technical Work Plan For: Preclosure Safety Analysis. TWP-MGR-SE-000010 
REV01. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: MOL.20011105.0325. 
BSC 2001c. Exploratory Studies Facility Fire Hazards Analysis. BABFAH000-01717-0210-
00121 REV 02. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: MOL.20010917.0184. 
BSC2001d. ECRB Refuge Chamber. BABEAF000-01717-0210-00011 REV 00. Las Vegas, 
Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. 
BSC 2001 e. Determination, Decision, or Directive Documentation. DF: 02-0013. Las Vegas, 
Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. 
BSC 2001 f ECRB Refuge Station General Arrangement and Details. BABEAFOOO-01717-
2100-40361 REV 00 DCN01. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. 
CRWMS M&O 1995. Topopah Springs Main Drift System Safety Analysis. BAB000000-
01717-0200-00149, REV 00. Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: 
MOL.19960606.0010. 
CRWMS M&O 1998. Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project East-West Drift System 
Safety Analysis. BAB000000-01717-0200-00004, REV 01 . Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS 
M&O. ACC: MOL. 19980825.0270. 
Kubicek, J.L. 2001. Exploratory Studies Facility Subsurface Fire Hazards Analysis. 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 02. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. 
ACC: MOL.20010917.0184. 
4.2 CODES, STANDARDS, AND REGULATIONS 
ANSI/IEEE (American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers) Standard C2, "National Electrical Safety Code". 
DOD (U.S. Department of Defense) 1993. Military System Safety Program Requirements. 
MILSTD882C. U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. TIC: 209468. 
NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) 122, "Standard for Fire Prevention and Control in 
Underground Metal and Nonmetal Fires". 
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NFPA 30, "Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code". 
OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Department of Labor) - 29 CFR 1926 
Subpart S; "Underground Construction, Caissons, Cofferdams and Compressed Air". 
YAP-30.48 Rev 1, ICN 2, "System Safety Analysis". 
5. ASSUMPTIONS 
• BSC will verify that the mitigation features required in this SSA are effectively 
implemented and are properly documented. 
• The conclusions of this SSA pertain only to the scenarios identified herein; specifically, 
they pertain to scenarios UI6001 to UI6005, as Listed in Table 3 and described in 
Appendix A. The Scenario descriptions provided in Appendix B are provided for 
information only. The hazard and risk information for these scenarios may not be 
current or complete and may be too severe when evaluated in light of current operations 
in the ECRB. 
• Future design changes will need to be evaluated to determine the impact on personnel 
safety and health. As future operational changes occur, this document and the scenarios 
provided (in Appendix A and Appendix B) will be re-examined and re-evaluated for the 
applicability of the scenarios to proposed operations and the applicability of 
mitigation/control features to these scenarios; especially as they apply to the ECRB. 
• All procedures, training, manuals, and other documentation identified as mitigation 
features are complete, comprehensive, and accurate. 
6. RESULTS 
The six SSA Accident Analysis Summaries involving fires in the ECRB Cross Drift, based on 
the Exploratory Studies Facility Subsurface Fire Hazards Analysis (Kubicek 2001) as well as the 
previously analyzed fire scenarios (presented in Table 4 and Appendix B), are presented in 
Appendix A. The previously analyzed SSA Accident Analysis Summaries involving fires in the 
ECRB Cross Drift as well as the TS Main Drift are reproduced in Appendix B. It should be 
noted that the scenarios in Appendix B are included for information purposes only, as described 
in Section 5. Due to the similarities of the designed systems in the TS Main Drift and the ECRB 
Cross-Drift, the TS Main Drift scenarios were used as a basis for developing the ECRB Cross-
Drift scenarios in Appendix B. The analysis of the six scenarios in Appendix A focused on 
personnel safety and health hazards associated with fires in the ECRB Cross-Drift for the 
purposes of qualitatively assigning a Hazard Classification to each scenario. The final Hazard 
Classification is based on the mitigation/control features required to achieve the final frequency 
and consequence levels. These six scenarios include the use of the ECRB Alcove 8 refuge 
station (equipped with bottled air) and the Station 73+63 Refuge Station as part of the 
mitigation/control features required to protect workers from the consequences of a fire in the 
ECRB Cross Drift. 
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The List of Scenarios Evaluated (Table 3) and List of Scenarios Previously Evaluated (Table 4) 
both contain a brief description of each scenario and a final frequency, consequence and risk 
rating that assumes that all of the mitigations and controls recommended have been fully 
implemented. A total of eighteen (18) scenarios are listed in these two tables. The detailed 
scenario analysis summaries are contained in Appendices A and B. Again, it should be noted 
that the scenarios in Appendix B are included for informational purposes only. The hazard risk 
information may not be applicable to the current physical characteristics and hazards associated 
with the ECRB and/or the Main Drift. In addition, mitigation and control features to address 
those hazards included in Appendix B may not be applicable to the current ECRB design and 
current ECRB operations. 
Each scenario was assigned a final risk level based upon the frequency and consequence of the 
potential hazards identified. In this analysis, there were zero (0) scenarios with a high risk 
designation, zero (0) scenarios with a medium risk designation, eleven (11) scenarios with a low 
risk designation, and six (7) scenarios with an extremely low risk designation. The Hazard Risk 
Matrix (Figure 2) illustrates the distribution of the risk ratings of the scenarios within the matrix. 
The risk designation serves two purposes: 
1) It is a qualitative indicator that can be used by management to determine whether the 
level of risk is acceptable or if additional safety mitigation features must be 
implemented to lower the risk to an acceptable level. 
2) It is a management tool that can be used to determine the order for addressing hazards 
and implementing the associated mitigation features. 
All of the events evaluated in this SSA were assigned a Final Hazard Classification of Low to 
Extremely Low. The worst-case fire, Scenario UI6005, has an Initial Hazard Classification of 
Medium due to a Remote Frequency Level and a Catastrophic Consequence Level. The Final 
Hazard Classification Level of this scenario (taking into account the required mitigation/control 
features) is Low based on a Catastrophic Final Consequence Level and an Improbable Frequency 
Level The Catastrophic Final Consequence Level (indicating that death and/or severe 
system/equipment damage may occur) reflects the conclusion that, in the event of the worst-case 
fire, personnel would only have between 50 and 60 seconds to seek refuge, as reported in 
Calculation of ECRB Cross-Drift Worst-Case Fire and Effects (BSC 2001a). For this reason, the 
Catastrophic Final Consequence Level is required for this scenario. Mitigation/control features 
such as automatic fire suppression equipment on the refueling/maintenance railcar, muck 
conveyors, locomotives, and diesel-powered equipment serve to reduce the frequency of a fire of 
such a severe magnitude that loss of life or severe system/equipment damage could occur, 
resulting in a Final Frequency Level of Improbable. Based on these frequency and consequence 
levels, a Final Hazard Classification of Low is assigned to the scenario. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The Exploratory Studies Facility Subsurface Fire Hazards Analysis (Kubicek 2001), SSAs 
previously completed concerning fire hazards, and the Calculation of ECRB Cross-Drift Worst-
Case Fire and Effects (BSC 2001a) analyses were examined to evaluate the ECRB fire-related 
BABOOOOOO-01717-0200-00150 REV 00 15 December 2001 
hazards, identify mitigation measures to control the hazards by design and/or administrative 
controls (including the use of an emergency refuge stations), and perform an assessment of the 
risk. The six SSA Accident Analysis Summaries based on this analysis are presented in 
Appendix A. All of the events evaluated in this SSA were assigned a Final Hazard Classification 
of Low to Extremely Low. Information concerning the design and hazards associated with the 
ECRB Cross-Drift was obtained from the M&O ESF Design organization (BSC 200Id, 
BSC2001e). 
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Table 3 List of Scenarios Evaluated 
Scenario ID 
Number Risk Level Frequency Consequence Scenario Description 
UI6001 Low 
UI6002 Low 
UI6003 
UI6004 
UI6005 
UI6006 Extremely 
Low 
E - Improbable II - Critical 
E - Improbable II - Critical 
Extremely 
Low 
Extremely 
Low 
Low 
E - Improbable III - Marginal 
E - Improbable III - Marginal 
E - Improbable I - Catastrophic 
D - Remote IV - Negligible 
Locomotive fire in the engine compartment, igniting 
diesel fuel Potential diesel spill could release up to a 
full tank (189 3 liters [50 gallons]) of fuel The burning 
diesel fuel damages the locomotive and equipment in 
the area, this damage could be severe with 
system/equipment loss, and workers in the area could 
potentially be injured 
Fire resulting from an accident with the maintenance 
railcar (either during transportation m the drift or when 
transporting combustible liquids [such as fuel] from the 
onboard storage tanks to mobile equipment) 
Equipment in the immediate area is damaged, with the 
potential for system/equipment loss or damage 
Workers in the area could potentially be injured by the 
fire 
Diesel-powered mobile equipment onboard fire The 
equipment is damaged with potential for major 
system/equipment damage and potential injury to 
workers 
Fire inside power distribution equipment, fire due to 
failure of electrical switchgear or other electrical 
equipment The damage to equipment/systems is minor 
with minor potential injury to workers 
A vehicle fuel tank or maintenance railcar storage tank 
ruptures, leaking diesel fuel from tank is ignited in the 
ECRB Cross-Drift The initial fire consumes the 
available diesel fuel and other fuel tanks fail in a 
successive manner Fire spreads to consume the ECRB 
Cross-Drift conveyor belt, and then consumes ECRB 
Cross-Drift wood rail ties The potential exists for 
severe system/equipment damage and the potential 
exists for loss of life to workers as a result of this fire 
Fire due to the ignition of trash, solvents, chemicals, or 
other combustible products Minor system/equipment 
damage results from this fire with the potential for 
minor injury to workers 
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Table 4. List of Scenarios Previously Evaluated 
Scenario ID Scenario 
Number Location Risk Level Frequency Consequence Scenario Description 
UI5028 
UI5030 
UI5057 
UI5080 
UI5086 
UI0354 
UI0355 
UI0356 
UI0357 
UI0358 
UI0359 
UI0361 
East-West Extremely E - Improbable III - Marginal 
Drift Low 
East-West Extremely D - Remote III - Marginal 
Drift Low 
East-West Extremely D - Remote III - Marginal 
Drift Low 
East-West Low E - Improbable II - Critical 
Drift 
East-West Low E - Improbable II - Critical 
Drift 
Main Drift Extremely D - Remote III - Marginal 
Low 
Main Drift Low E - Improbable II - Critical 
Main Drift Low E - Improbable II - Critical 
Main Drift Low E - Improbable II - Critical 
Main Drift Low E - Improbable II - Critical 
Main Drift Low E - Improbable II - Critical 
Main Drift Low E - Improbable II - Critical 
Fire involving subsurface vehicle (e.g., 
Alpine Miner, front-end loader, drill 
jumbo) or temporarily stored materials. 
Fire due to failure/short/overload of 
electrical switchgear or other electncal 
equipment (e g , transformer, electncal 
panel box, electncal wire or cable). 
General underground fire due to 
ignition of trash, solvents, chemicals, or 
other combustible products 
Fire hazards: Conveyor system. 
Vehicle diesel fire hazard diesel 
leak(s) from fuel tank or fuel lines 
during refueling activities (dropping 
container, inattention to refueling 
process) 
Personnel injury/equipment damage 
caused by a diesel fuel fire due to diesel 
fuel leak within engine compartment 
Personnel injury/equipment damage 
caused by a diesel fuel fire due to 
electncal ignition sources in the 
presence of diesel fuel, hydraulic fluid, 
lubncating oil, flammable cleaning 
solvents, disposable clean-up matenals. 
Personnel injury/equipment damage 
caused by a diesel fuel fire due to 
mechanical ignition sources in the 
presence of diesel fuel, hydraulic fluid, 
lubncating oil, flammable cleaning 
solvents, disposable clean-up matenals 
Personnel injury/equipment damage 
caused by a diesel fuel fire due to 
ignition by open flame or heating 
device in the presence of diesel fuel, 
hydraulic fluid, lubncating oil, 
flammable cleaning solvents, 
disposable clean up matenals 
Personnel injury/equipment damage 
caused by diesel fire on diesel 
locomotive while transporting diesel 
fuel into tunnel 
Personnel injury/equipment damage 
caused by fire in diesel fuel storage 
area. 
Personnel injury/equipment damage 
caused by a diesel fuel fire due to diesel 
fuel leak from fuel tank. 
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Figure 2. Scenarios Distributed Over Hazard Risk Matrix 
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APPENDIX A 
SCENARIO ANALYSIS SUMMARIES 
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Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI6001 2. Revision: 0 3. Revision Date: December 2001 
4. Location: ECRB Cross-Drift 
5. Scenario Description: Locomotive fire in the engine compartment, igniting diesel fuel Potential diesel spill 
could release up to a full tank (189 3 liters [50 gallons]) of fuel The burning diesel fuel damages the locomotive 
and equipment in the area, this damage could be severe with system/equipment loss, and workers in the area could 
potentially be injured 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
• Diesel fuel spill or leak onto hot surfaces (e g brakes, worn beanngs) 
• Diesel fuel line leak caused by age, rust, or wear 
• Diesel fuel leak due to failure of mechanical joint 
• Diesel fuel leak dunng refueling of diesel equipment 
• Human Error 
• Failure to adhere to safety procedures and rules 
• Component failure (e g , valve leak) 
7. INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating I - Catastrophic 
Initial Risk Rating Low 
8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Venfication Required) 
• Emergency Refuge Stations in the ECRB Cross-Dnft 1) Alcove 8 refuge station equipped with 
respirators/bottle air system, half-mask respirators, and self-contained self-rescuers, 2) Bulkhead 17+63 
refuge station with large volume of dnft air equipped with gas detection/monitonng equipment and half-
mask respirators 
• Procedures/controls to limit the number of visitors/workers in the ECRB Cross-Dnft according to the 
number of respirators/compressed air bottles in the Emergency Refuge Station at Alcove 8 (30 persons 
corresponding to 30 bottles, up to a maximum of 53 persons corresponding to 53 bottles) 
• Automatic fire suppression on the locomotive 
• Fire suppression system/equipment (e g portable multi-purpose dry chemical fire extinguishers) 
• Personal self-rescuers 
Install ESF alarm/notification system improvements 
Install exit and emergency lighting systems 
• 
b. Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements (l e , OSH A) 
• Compressed air system as redundant air supply system to the ECRB Cross-Drift Emergency Refuge 
Station(s) 
• Fire emergency procedures 
• Establish regular inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule, maintain inspection and safety 
records 
• Safety training 
BAB000000-01717-0200-00150 REV 00 A-2 December 2001 
9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• Exploratory Studies Facility Subsurface Fire Hazards Analysis, BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 Rev 02 
• Calculation of ECRB Cross-Dnft Worst-Case Fire and Effects, BAB000000-01717-0210-00001 Rev 00 
• ECRB Refuge Station General Arrangement and Details BABEAF000-01717-2100-40361 REV 00 
DCN01 
• ECRB Refuge Chamber, BABEAFOOO-01717-0210-00011 REV00 
• Determination, Decision, or Directive Documentation DF 02-0013 
• NFPA 122, Standard for Fire Prevention and Control in Underground Metal and Nonmetal Fires 
• OSHA - 29 CFR 1926 Subpart S, Underground Construction, Caissons, Cofferdams, and Compressed Air 
• NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures 
• General Safety Manuals and Training 
• Operating and Maintenance Instructions 
Note: Upon completion of the installation of the Emergency Refuge Stations, the drawings, training 
lesson plans, procedures, manufacturer's operations and maintenance manuals, etc. will be updated to 
reflect the design and operation of the Emergency Refuge Stations as well as other mitigation/control 
features. 
10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating II - Critical 
Initial Risk Rating Low 
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Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI6002 2. Revision: 0 3. Revision Date: December 2001 
4. Location: ECRB Cross-Drift 
5. Scenario Description: Fire resulting from an accident with the maintenance railcar (either during transportation 
in the drift or when transporting combustible liquids [such as fuel] from the onboard storage tanks to mobile 
equipment). Equipment in the immediate area is damaged; with the potential for system/equipment loss or damage. 
Workers in the area could potentially be injured by the fire. 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
• Mechanical failure(s) of container/tank 
• Failure of fuel lines/joints 
• Human error during refueling activities (dropping container, inattention to refueling process) 
• Diesel fuel spill or leak onto hot surfaces (e.g., brakes, worn bearings) 
• Failure to adhere to safety procedures and rules 
• Component failure (e.g., valve leak) 
7. INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating: E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating: I - Catastrophic 
Initial Risk Rating: Low 
BABOOOOOO-01717-0200-00150 REV 00 A-4 December 2001 
8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Venfication Required) 
• Emergency Refuge Stations in the ECRB Cross-Dnft 1) Alcove 8 refuge station equipped with 
respirators/bottle air system, half-mask respirators, and self-contained self-rescuers, 2) Bulkhead 17+63 
refuge station with large volume of dnft air equipped with gas detection/momtonng equipment and half-
mask respirators 
• Procedures/controls to limit the number of visitors/workers in the ECRB Cross-Dnft according to the 
number of respirators/compressed air bottles in the Emergency Refuge Station at Alcove 8 (30 persons 
corresponding to 30 bottles, up to a maximum of 53 persons corresponding to 53 bottles) 
• Procedures/controls to limit the number of workers in the ECRB Cross-Drift to 5 (five) when the 
maintenance cart is pulled into the ECRB Cross-Drift to perform refueling activities 
• Fire suppression system/equipment (e g , portable multi-purpose dry chemical fire extinguishers) 
• Personal Self-Rescuers 
• Automatic fire suppression on the refueling vehicle/maintenance railcar 
• Establish procedures for refueling activities, including establishing the number of workers required for 
refueling activities 
b. Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements (l e , OSHA) 
• Compressed air system as redundant air supply system to the ECRB Cross-Drift Emergency Refuge 
Station(s) 
• Fire emergency procedures 
• Establish regular inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule, including diesel engine 
compartment and fuel lines, maintain inspection and safety records 
• Operator training on proper methods for handling diesel fuel and refueling procedures 
• Safety training 
9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• Exploratory Studies Facility Subsurface Fire Hazards Analysis, BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 Rev 02 
• Calculation of ECRB Cross-Dnft Worst-Case Fire and Effects, BAB000000-01717-0210-00001 Rev 00 
• ECRB Refuge Chamber, BABEAFOOO-01717-0210-00011 REV00 
• ECRB Refuge Station General Arrangement and Details BABEAF000-01717-2100-40361 REV 00 
DCN01 
• Determination, Decision, or Directive Documentation DF 02-0013 
• NFPA 122, Standard for Fire Prevention and Control in Underground Metal and Nonmetal Fires 
• OSHA - 29 CFR 1926 Subpart S, Underground Construction, Caissons, Cofferdams, and Compressed Air 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures 
• General Safety Manuals and Training 
• Operating and Maintenance Instructions 
Note: Upon completion of the installation of the Emergency Refuge Stations, the drawings, training 
lesson plans, procedures, manufacturer's operations and maintenance manuals, etc. will be updated to 
reflect the design and operation of the Emergency Refuge Stations as well as other mitigation/control 
features. 
10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating II - Cntical 
Initial Risk Rating Low 
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Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI6003 2. Revision: 0 3. Revision Date: December 2001 
4. Location: ECRB Cross-Dnft 
5. Scenario Description: Diesel-powered mobile equipment onboard fire. The equipment is damaged with 
potential for major system/equipment damage and potential injury to workers 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
• Accident involving transient combustible matenals 
• Unsafe vehicles (e g., improper maintenance) 
• Diesel fuel spill or leak onto hot surfaces (e g., brakes, worn bearings) 
• Diesel fuel line leak caused by age, rust, or wear 
• Diesel fuel leak due to failure of mechanical joint 
• Diesel fuel leak dunng refueling of diesel equipment 
• Human error 
• Failure to adhere to safety procedures and rules 
Component failure 
INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating- E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating: II - Cntical 
Initial Risk Rating. Low 
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8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Venfication Required) 
• Emergency Refuge Stations in the ECRB Cross-Dnft 1) Alcove 8 refuge station equipped with 
respirators/bottle air system, half-mask respirators, and self-contained self-rescuers, 2) Bulkhead 17+63 
refuge station with large volume of dnft air equipped with gas detection/monitoring equipment and half-
mask respirators 
• Procedures/controls to limit the number of visitors/workers in the ECRB Cross-Dnft according to the 
number of respirators/compressed air bottles in the Emergency Refuge Station at Alcove 8 (30 persons 
corresponding to 30 bottles, up to a maximum of 53 persons corresponding to 53 bottles) 
• Procedures/controls to limit the number of workers in the ECRB Cross-Dnft to 5 (five) when the 
maintenance cart is pulled into the ECRB Cross-Drift to perform refueling activities 
• Automatic fire suppression on diesel-powered mobile equipment 
• Fire suppression system/equipment (e g , portable multi-purpose dry chemical fire extinguishers) 
• Install ESF alarm/notification system improvements 
• Personal self-rescuers 
b. Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements (l e , OSHA) 
• Compressed air system as redundant air supply system to the ECRB Cross-Dnft Emergency Refuge 
Station(s) 
• Fire emergency procedures 
• Establish regular inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule, maintain inspection and safety 
records 
• Safety training 
9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• Exploratory Studies Facility Subsurface Fire Hazards Analysis, BABFAHOOO-01717-0200-00121 Rev 02 
• Calculation of ECRB Cross-Dnft Worst-Case Fire and Effects, BAB000000-01717-0210-00001 Rev 00 
• ECRB Refuge Chamber, BABEAFOOO-01717-0210-00011 REV00 
• ECRB Refuge Station General Arrangement and Details BABEAF000-01717-2100-40361 REV 00 
DCN01 
• Determination, Decision, or Directive Documentation DF 02-0013 
• NFPA 122, Standard for Fire Prevention and Control in Underground Metal and Nonmetal Fires 
• OSHA - 29 CFR 1926 Subpart S, Underground Construction, Caissons, Cofferdams, and Compressed Air 
• NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures 
• General Safety Manuals and Training 
• Operating and Maintenance Instructions 
Note: Upon completion of the installation of the Emergency Refuge Stations, the drawings, training 
lesson plans, procedures, manufacturer's operations and maintenance manuals, etc. will be updated to 
reflect the design and operation of the Emergency Refuge Stations as well as other mitigation/control 
features. 
10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating III - marginal 
Initial Risk Rating Extremely Low 
BABOOOOOO-01717-0200-00150 REV 00 A-7 December 2001 
Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI6004 2. Revision: 0 3. Revision Date: December 2001 
4. Location: ECRB Cross-Drift 
5. Scenario Description: Fire inside power distnbution equipment, fire due to failure of electncal switchgear or 
other electncal equipment The damage to equipment/systems is minor with minor potential injury to workers 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
• Short circuit, wire insulation failure 
• Transformer or electrical panel failure or overload 
• Lighting fixture failure or damage 
• Battery or generator electncal discharge 
• Human error (bad winng) 
• Component failure 
INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating D - Remote 
Consequence Rating III - Marginal 
Initial Risk Rating Extremely Low 
8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Venfication Required) 
• Emergency Refuge Stations in the ECRB Cross-Dnft 1) Alcove 8 refuge station equipped with 
respirators/bottle air system, half-mask respirators, and self-contained self-rescuers, 2) Bulkhead 17+63 
refuge station with large volume of drift air equipped with gas detection/momtonng equipment and half-
mask respirators 
• Procedures/controls to limit the number of visitors/workers in the ECRB Cross-Drift according to the 
number of respirators/compressed air bottles in the Emergency Refuge Station at Alcove 8 (30 persons 
corresponding to 30 bottles, up to a maximum of 53 persons corresponding to 53 bottles) 
• Fire suppression system/equipment (e g , portable multi-purpose dry chemical fire extinguishers) 
• Design electncal systems to all applicable codes and standards 
• Conduct inspections dunng installation and connection to power supply 
• Use protective devices (e g , fuses, circuit breakers) where appropriate 
• Field test according to applicable specifications 
• Ensure cable and equipment meet applicable codes and standards 
• Install ESF alarm/notification system improvements 
• Personal self-rescuers 
b. Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements (I e , OSHA) 
• Compressed air system as redundant air supply system to the ECRB Cross-Drift Emergency Refuge 
Station(s) 
• Fire emergency procedures 
• Establish regular inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule, maintain inspection and safety 
records 
• Safety training 
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9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• Exploratory Studies Facility Subsurface Fire Hazards Analysis, BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 Rev. 02 
• Calculation of ECRB Cross-Drift Worst-Case Fire and Effects,.BABOOOOOO-01717-0210-00001 Rev. 00 
• ECRB Refuge Chamber, BABEAFOOO-01717-0210-00011 REV00 
• ECRB Refuge Station General Arrangement and Details. BABEAF000-01717-2100-40361 REV 00 
DCN01 
• Determination, Decision, or Directive Documentation. DF: 02-0013 
• ANSI/IEEE C2, National Electrical Safety Code 
• OSHA - 29 CFR 1926 Subpart S, Underground Construction, Caissons, Cofferdams, and Compressed Air 
• NEMA and UL standards 
• System Specifications 
• Maintenance Manuals 
• Safety Manuals 
• Inspection and Maintenance Records 
Note: Upon completion of the installation of the Emergency Refuge Stations, the drawings, training 
lesson plans, procedures, manufacturer's operations and maintenance manuals, etc. will be updated to 
reflect the design and operation of the Emergency Refuge Stations as well as other mitigation/control 
features. 
10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating: E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating: HI - Marginal 
Initial Risk Rating: Extremely Low 
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Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI6005 2. Revision: 0 3. Revision Date: December 2001 
4. Location: ECRB Cross-Drift 
5. Scenario Description: A vehicle fuel tank or maintenance railcar storage tank ruptures, leaking diesel fuel from 
tank is ignited in the ECRB Cross-Drift The initial fire consumes the available diesel fuel and other fuel tanks fail 
in a successive manner Fire spreads to consume the ECRB Cross-Dnft conveyor belt, and then consumes ECRB 
Cross-Dnft wood rail ties The potential exists for severe system/equipment damage and the potential exists for loss 
of life to workers as a result of this fire 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
• Mechanical failure(s) of fuel tank(s) 
• Failure of fuel lines/joints 
• Diesel fuel spill or leak onto hot surfaces (e g , brakes, worn bearings) 
• Component failure (e g valve leak) 
7. INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating D - Remote 
Consequence Rating I - Catastrophic 
Initial Risk Rating Medium 
8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Venfication Required) 
• Emergency Refuge Stations in the ECRB Cross-Dnft 1) Alcove 8 refuge station equipped with 
respirators/bottle air system, half-mask respirators, and self-contained self-rescuers, 2) Bulkhead 17+63 
refuge station with large volume of dnft air equipped with gas detection/momtonng equipment and half-
mask respirators 
• Procedures/controls to limit the number of visitors/workers in the ECRB Cross-Dnft according to the 
number of respirators/compressed air bottles in the Emergency Refuge Station at Alcove 8 (30 persons 
corresponding to 30 bottles, up to a maximum of 53 persons corresponding to 53 bottles) 
• Procedures/controls to limit the number of workers in the ECRB Cross-Drift to 5 (five) when the 
maintenance cart is pulled into the ECRB Cross-Drift to perform refueling activities 
• Fire suppression system/equipment (e g , portable multi-purpose dry chemical fire extinguishers) 
• Automatic fire suppression on the refueling vehicle/maintenance railcar, muck conveyors, locomotives, 
and diesel-powered mobile equipment 
• Install ESF alarm/notification system improvements 
• Personal self-rescuers 
Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements (l e , OSHA) 
• Compressed air system as redundant air supply system to the ECRB Cross-Dnft Emergency Refuge 
Station(s) 
• Fire emergency procedures 
• Establish regular inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule, maintain inspection and safety 
records 
• Safety training 
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9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• Exploratory Studies Facility Subsurface Fire Hazards Analysis, BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 Rev. 02 
• Calculation of ECRB Cross-Drift Worst-Case Fire and Effects, BAB000000-01717-0210-00001 Rev. 00 
• ECRB Refuge Chamber, BABEAFOOO-01717-0210-00011 REV00 
• ECRB Refuge Station General Arrangement and Details. BABEAF000-01717-2100-40361 REV 00 
DCN01 
• Determination, Decision, or Directive Documentation. DF: 02-0013 
• NFPA 122, Standard for Fire Prevention and Control in Underground Metal and Nonmetal Fires 
• OSHA - 29 CFR 1926 Subpart S, Underground Construction, Caissons, Cofferdams, and Compressed Air 
• NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures 
• General Safety Manuals and Training 
• Operating and Maintenance Instructions 
Note: Upon completion of the installation of the Emergency Refuge Stations, the drawings, training 
lesson plans, procedures, manufacturer's operations and maintenance manuals, etc. will be updated to 
reflect the design and operation of the Emergency Refuge Stations as well as other mitigation/control 
features. 
10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating: E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating: I - Catastrophic 
Initial Risk Rating: Low 
BAB000000-01717-0200-00150 REV 00 A-11 December 2001 
Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI6006 2. Revision: 0 3. Revision Date: December 2001 
4. Location: ECRB Cross-Dnft 
5. Scenario Description: Fire due to the ignition of trash, solvents, chemicals, or other combustible products 
Minor system/equipment damage results from this fire with the potential for minor injury to workers 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
• Welding or cutting operations 
• Electrical cables 
• Electncal connections/splices 
• Outlets sparking in the presence of hydraulic fluid, lubricating oil, cleaning solvents, disposable cleaning 
matenals, trash or other transient debns 
• Catalytic reactions involving the above matenals 
• Human Error 
• Failure to adhere to safety procedures and rules 
7. INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating D - Remote 
Consequence Rating III - Marginal 
Initial Risk Rating Extremely Low 
8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Venfication Required) 
• Emergency Refuge Stations in the ECRB Cross-Dnft 1) Alcove 8 refuge station equipped with 
respirators/bottle air system, half-mask respirators, and self-contained self-rescuers, 2) Bulkhead 17+63 
refuge station with large volume of drift air equipped with gas detection/momtonng equipment and half-
mask respirators 
• Procedures/controls to limit the number of visitors/workers in the ECRB Cross-Dnft according to the 
number of respirators/compressed air bottles in the Emergency Refuge Station at Alcove 8 (30 persons 
corresponding to 30 bottles, up to a maximum of 53 persons corresponding to 53 bottles) 
• Fire suppression system/equipment (e g portable multi-purpose dry chemical fire extinguishers) 
• Personal self-rescuers 
• Install ESF alarm/notification system improvements 
• Install exit and emergency lighting systems 
b. Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements (l e , OSHA) 
• Compressed air system as redundant air supply system to the ECRB Cross-Dnft Emergency Refuge 
Station(s) 
• Fire emergency procedures 
• Procedures for handling or working with combustible matenals 
• Weld, cut and burn procedures 
• "Good Housekeeping procedures 
• Establish regular inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule, maintain inspection and safety 
records 
• Safety training, including identification of fire hazards and corrective actions 
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9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• Exploratory Studies Facility Subsurface Fire Hazards Analysis, BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 Rev 02 
• Calculation of ECRB Cross-Dnft Worst-Case Fire and Effects, BAB000000-01717-0210-00001 Rev 00 
• ECRB Refuge Chamber, BABEAFOOO-01717-0210-00011 REV00 
• ECRB Refuge Station General Arrangement and Details BABEAF000-01717-2100-40361 REV 00 
DCN01 
• Determination, Decision, or Directive Documentation DF 02-0013 
• ANSI/IEEE C2, National Electncal Safety Code 
• NEMA and UL standards 
• NFPA 122, Standard for Fire Prevention and Control in Underground Metal and Nonmetal Fires 
• OSHA - 29 CFR 1926 Subpart S, Underground Construction, Caissons, Cofferdams, and Compressed Air 
• NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures 
• General Safety Manuals and Training 
• Operating and Maintenance Instructions 
Note: Upon completion of the installation of the Emergency Refuge Stations, the drawings, training 
lesson plans, procedures, manufacturer's operations and maintenance manuals, etc. will be updated to 
reflect the design and operation of the Emergency Refuge Stations as well as other mitigation/control 
features. 
10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating D - Remote 
Consequence Rating IV - Negligible 
Initial Risk Rating Extremely Low 
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APPENDIX B 
PREVIOUSLY COMPLETED SCENARIO ANALYSIS SUMMARIES 
BABOOOOOO-01717-0200-00150 REV 00 B-l December 2001 
Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI5028 2. Revision: 00 3. Revision Date: 10/28/97 
4. Location: East-West Drift 
5. Scenario Description: Fire involving subsurface vehicle (e g , Alpine Miner, front-end loader, dnll jumbo) or 
temporanly stored matenals 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
• Unsafe vehicles (e g , improper maintenance) 
• Fuel source (diesel fuel) exposed to ignition source (e g , spark, flame) 
• Use of unauthorized vehicle underground 
• Poor housekeeping 
• Lack of storage space/facilities 
• Failure to adhere to safety procedures 
7. INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Consequence Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Initial Risk Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Venfication Required) 
• Implementing Procedures for handling/working around combustible materials (e g, disposal, proper 
storage, no smoking) 
• Use fire-resistant matenals whenever practical 
• Provide approved storage containers 
• Limit diesel fuel storage volume to no more than 24-hour supply 
• Provide safety training (e g , rules and regulations concerning employee safety and the safety of others, 
parking of vehicles 
• Install portable extinguisher and hose station in the Starter Tunnel 
• Install onboard fire suppression systems (hose stations and portable fire extinguishers on locomotives and 
front-end loaders 
Establish vehicle inspection and maintenance schedule 
Evacuate in accordance with Emergency Plan 
Ventilation system 
Use of self-rescuer as required 
b. Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements (I e , OSHA) 
Not Available/Not Completed 
9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• OSHA - 29 CFR 1926 800, NFPA Fire Protection Rules and Regulations 
• Maintenance manuals and safety manual 
• Inspection and maintenance records 
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10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating: E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating: III - Marginal 
Initial Risk Rating: Extremely Low 
BABOOOOOO-01717-0200-00150 REV 00 B-3 December 2001 
Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI5030 2. Revision: 00 3. Revision Date: 10/28/97 
4. Location: East-West Dnft 
5. Scenario Description: Fire due to failure/short/overload of electncal switchgear or other electncal equipment 
(e g , transformer, electrical panel box, electncal wire or cable) 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
• Bad winding insulation 
• Short circuit inside electncal panel box 
• Insulation failure (e g , cable breach, electncal overload) 
7. INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Consequence Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Initial Risk Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Venfication Required) 
• Design electrical systems/components to applicable codes and standards 
• Conduct inspections during installation and connection 
• Incorporate protective devices (e g , fuses, circuit breakers, temperature relays) where appropriate 
• Field test according to applicable specifications 
• Provide portable extinguisher and hose station in Starter Tunnel 
• Establish inspection and maintenance schedule 
• Provide safety training 
• Ensure cable meets applicable codes and standards 
b. Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements (l e , OSHA) 
Not Available/Not Completed 
9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• ANSI/IEEE C2-93, OSHA 29 CFR 1926 
• National Safety Code 
• National Electncal Code 
• NEMA and UL standards 
• System specifications, 
• Maintenance manuals 
• Safety manuals 
• Inspection and maintenance records 
10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating D - Remote 
Consequence Rating III - Marginal 
Initial Risk Rating Extremely Low 
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Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI5057 2. Revision: 0 3. Revision Date: 10/28/97 
4. Location: East-West Dnft 
5. Scenario Description: General underground fire due to ignition of trash, solvents, chemicals, or other 
combustible products 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
• Electncal cables 
• Connections (splices) 
• Outlets sparking in the presence of hydraulic fluid, lubncation oil, diesel fuel, cleaning solvents, 
disposable cleanup matenals, or catalytic reactions involving the above materials 
• Lack of storage space/facilities 
7. INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Consequence Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Initial Risk Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Venfication Required) 
• Implement JSAs/procedures for handling or working with combustible matenals 
• Minimize use of combustible matenals underground 
• "Weld, cut and burn" procedures in effect for all underground areas 
• Use fire-resistant matenals whenever practical 
• Provide approved storage containers 
• Provide safety training (e g , identification of fire hazards, corrective actions) 
• Install portable extinguisher and hose stations in the Starter Tunnel 
• Limit diesel fuel storage volume to no more than 24-hour supply 
• Implement good "house keeping" in the subsurface 
• Use self-rescuer as required 
• Ventilation system 
• Implement emergency evacuation plan 
b. Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements (I e , OSHA) 
Not Available/Not Completed 
9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• Safety Manuals 
• OSHA - 29 CFR 1926 Subpart S 
• NFPA Fire Protection Rules and Regulations 
10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating D - Remote 
Consequence Rating III - Marginal 
Initial Risk Rating Extremely Low 
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Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI5080 2. Revision: 0 3. Revision Date: 10/28/97 
4. Location: East-West Dnft 
5. Scenario Description: Fire hazards Conveyor system 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
• Conveyor belt fire due to friction on beanngs 
• Idlers frozen 
7. INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Consequence Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Initial Risk Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Venfication Required) 
• Install automatic fire suppression systems at all transfer points 
• Install fire resistant belts 
• Provide wall-mounted fire extinguishers at each electric panel site and every 500-600 feet on the tunnel 
wall 
• Establish inspection, maintenance procedures and schedule for conveyor components, maintain inspection 
and maintenance records 
b. Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements (l e , OSHA) 
Not Available/Not Completed 
9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• OSHA - 29 CFR 1926 Subparts S & F 
• NFPA Fire Protection Rules and Regulations 
• System specifications 
• Maintenance and safety manuals 
10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating II - Cntical 
Initial Risk Rating Low 
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Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI5086 2. Revision: 0 3. Revision Date: 10/28/97 
4. Location: East-West Dnft 
5. Scenario Description: Vehicle diesel fire hazard diesel leak(s) from fuel tank or fuel lines during refueling 
activities (dropping container, inattention to refueling process) 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
• Mechanical failure(s) of container, fuel lines/joints 
• Human error dunng refueling activities (dropping container, inattention to refueling process) 
7. INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Consequence Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Initial Risk Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Venfication Required) 
• Install automatic fire suppression on the refueling vehicle 
• Daily inspection of diesel engine compartment and fuel lines to detect any small leaks 
• All diesel refueling activities shall be a two-man operation One refuels and the other mans the fire 
extinguisher and diesel fuel cutoff valve 
• Provide an automatic and/or manual fire suppression system in vehicle engine compartment 
• Operator training on proper methods of handling diesel fuel and refueling procedures 
b. Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements (l e , OSHA) 
Not Available/Not Completed 
9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• NFPA 124, Diesel Fuel and Diesel Equipment in Underground Mines 
• NFPA 122, Standard for Storage of Flammable and Combustible Liquids within Underground Metal and 
Non-Metal Mines 
• OSHA - 29 CFR 1926 Subpart S 
• Subsurface Fire Hazards Analysis, BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 Rev 0 
• Subsurface Fire Protection Design Analysis, babfah000-01717-0200-00114 Rev 0 
• Subsurface Fire Protection, BABFAH000-01717-6300-16721 Rev 0 
• Fire Alarm and Smoke Detector System, BABFAH000-01717-6300-16721 Rev 0 
• National Fire Protection Association NFPA 30-93 
• Uniform Fire Code UFC-91 
Emergency evacuation plan and procedures 
• Maintenance, operations and housekeeping procedures 
• Inspection and maintenance records 
10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating II - Cntical 
Initial Risk Rating Low 
• 
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Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI0354 2. Revision: 01 3. Revision Date: 7/8/96 
4. Location: Main Drift 
5. Scenario Description: Personnel injury/equipment damage caused by a diesel fuel fire due to diesel fuel leak 
within engine compartment 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
• Diesel fuel spill or leak on hot surfaces (e g, engine exhaust manifold, turbocharger, brakes, worn 
beanngs) 
• Diesel fuel line leak caused by age/rust or wear 
• Diesel fuel leak due to failure of mechanical joint 
• Human error (e g puncturing diesel fuel line) 
• Diesel fuel leak during refueling of diesel equipment 
INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Consequence Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Initial Risk Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Verification Required) 
Control electncal sparking (use appropnate codes and regulations) 
Control cigarette smoking around diesel equipment and diesel fuel 
Control welding/cutting operation around diesel fuel tanks/containers 
Provide at least one portable (ABC) dry chemical fire extinguisher on all mobile diesel equipment 
Employee training on the location of and proper use of fire extinguisher and alternate fire suppression 
methods for fighting diesel fires in its incipient stage 
Provide an automatic and/or manual fire suppression system for all mobile diesel equipment 
Diesel fuel tanks for mobile diesel equipment shall be made of metal at least 1/16 " thick welded at all 
seams and mounted in a position to preclude damage during use 
No separate or auxiliary fuel tank shall be attached on mobile diesel equipment 
Install a fire detection system, portable fire extinguisher, and water hose stations along the main dnft 
Operator training on the proper methods of handling diesel fuel and refueling of diesel equipment 
Establish inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule Maintain inspection and maintenance 
records 
Emergency evacuation plan and procedures 
Refuge chambers 
Employee safety training on fire hazards, proper personal protective equipment and the proper use of self 
rescuers 
b. Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements (l e , OSHA) 
Not Available/Not Completed 
BABOOOOOO-01717-0200-00150 REV 00 B-8 December 2001 
9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• NFPA 124, Diesel Fuel and Diesel Equipment in Underground Mines 
• FPA 122, Standard for Storage of Flammable and Combustible Liquids Within Underground Metal and 
Non-Metal Mines 
• OSHA - 29 CFR 1926 Subpart S 
• Subsurface Fire Hazard Analysis, BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 Rev 0 
• Subsurface Fire Protection Design Analysis, BABFAHOOO-01717-0200-00114 Rev 0 
• Subsurface Fire Protection, BABFAH000-01717-6300-15300 Rev 0 
• Fire Alarm And Smoke Detector System, BABBEBOOO-01717-6300-16721 Rev 0 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures * 
• Maintenance, operations and housekeeping procedures Inspection and maintenance records* 
*It is the constructor's and operator's responsibility to assure that the hazard(s) associated with this scenario 
have been mitigated through proper documentation 
10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating D - Remote 
Consequence Rating III - Marginal 
Risk Designation Extremely Low 
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Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI0355 2. Revision: 01 3. Revision Date: 7/8/96 
4. Location: Main Drift 
5. Scenario Description: Personnel injury/equipment damage caused by a diesel fuel fire due to electncal ignition 
sources m the presence of diesel fuel, hydraulic fluid, lubncating oil, flammable cleaning solvents, disposable clean 
up matenals 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
• Short circuit, wire insulation failure 
• Transformer or electncal panel failure or overload 
• Battery or generator electncal discharge 
• Lighting fixture failure or damage 
INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Consequence Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Initial Risk Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Verification Required) 
• Control electncal sparking (use appropnate codes and regulations and inspection procedures using sealed 
motors or TEFC motors where appropriate) 
• Incorporate protective devices (e g fuses, circuit breakers, temperature relays) 
• Control fuel sources (hydraulic fluid, lubncating oil, diesel fuel, flammable cleaning solvents, disposable 
clean up materials) 
Install a fire detection system, portable fire extinguisher, and water hose stations along the main dnft 
Employee training on the location of and proper use of fire extinguisher and alternate fire suppression 
methods for fighting diesel fires in its incipient stage 
• Provide at least one portable (ABC) dry chemical fire extinguisher on all mobile diesel equipment 
• Provide an automatic and/or manual fire suppression system for all mobile diesel equipment 
• Diesel fuel tanks for mobile diesel equipment shall be made of metal at least 1/16 " thick welded at all 
seams and mounted in a position to preclude damage during use 
• No separate or auxiliary fuel tank shall be attached on mobile diesel equipment 
• Establish inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule, maintain inspection and maintenance 
records 
• Establish good housekeeping practice to control combustible matenals 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures 
• Refuge chambers 
• Employee safety training on fire hazards, proper personal protective equipment and the proper use of self 
rescuers 
b. Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements (l e , OSHA) 
Not Available/Not Completed 
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9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• NFPA 124, Diesel Fuel and Diesel Equipment in Underground Mines 
• NFPA 122, Standard for Storage of Flammable and Combustible Liquids Within Underground Metal and 
Non-Metal Mines 
• OSHA - 29 CFR 1926 Subpart S 
• Subsurface Fire Hazard Analysis, BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 Rev. 0 
• Subsurface Fire Protection Design Analysis, BABFAHOOO-01717-0200-00114 Rev. 0 
• Subsurface Fire Protection, BABFAH000-01717-6300-15300 Rev. 0 
• Fire Alarm And Smoke Detector System, BABBEB000-01717-6300-16721 Rev. 0 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures* 
• Maintenance, operations and housekeeping procedures. Inspection and maintenance records* 
*It is the constructor's and operator's responsibility to assure that the hazard(s) associated with this scenario 
have been mitigated through proper documentation. 
10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating: E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating: II - Critical 
Risk Designation: Low 
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Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI0356 2. Revision: 01 3. Revision Date: 7/8/96 
4. Location: Main Drift 
5. Scenario Description: Personnel injury/equipment damage caused by a diesel fuel fire due to mechanical 
ignition sources in the presence of diesel fuel, hydraulic fluid, lubricating oil, flammable cleaning solvents, 
disposable clean up matenals 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
• Mechanical (friction) sparking due to lockup or impact 
• Overheating of beanngs, brakes, motors 
7. INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Consequence Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Initial Risk Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Venfication Required) 
• Control fuel sources (hydraulic fluid, lubncating oil, diesel fuel, flammable cleaning solvents, disposable 
clean up matenals) 
• Install a fire detection system, portable fire extinguisher, and water hose stations along the main drift 
• Employee training on the location of and proper use of fire extinguisher and alternate fire suppression 
methods for fighting diesel fires in its incipient stage 
• Provide at least one portable (ABC) dry chemical fire extinguisher on all mobile diesel equipment 
• Provide an automatic and/or manual fire suppression system for all mobile diesel equipment 
• Diesel fuel tanks for mobile diesel equipment shall be made of metal at least 1/16 " thick welded at all 
seams and mounted in a position to preclude damage during use 
• No separate or auxiliary fuel tank shall be attached on mobile diesel equipment 
• Establish inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule, maintain inspection and maintenance 
records 
• Establish good housekeeping practice to control combustible matenals 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures 
• Refuge chambers 
• Employee safety training on fire hazards, proper personal protective equipment and the proper use of self 
rescuers 
b. Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements, (l e , OSHA) 
Not Available/Not Completed 
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9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• NFPA 124, Diesel Fuel and Diesel Equipment in Underground Mines 
• NFPA 122, Standard for Storage of Flammable and Combustible Liquids Within Underground Metal and 
Non-Metal Mines 
• OSHA - 29 CFR 1926 Subpart S 
• Subsurface Fire Protection, BABFAH000-O1717-63OO-153OO Rev. 0 
• Fire Alarm And Smoke Detector System, BABBEB000-01717-6300-16721 Rev.O 
• Surface and Subsurface Material Handling Flow Diagram, BABFCOOOO-01717-2100-45031, (Identifies 
locations of automatic dry chemical fire suppression systems for the surface and subsurface conveyor) 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures.* 
• Maintenance, operations and housekeeping procedures. Inspection and maintenance records* 
*It is the constructor's and operator's responsibility to assure that the hazard(s) associated with this scenario 
have been mitigated through proper documentation. 
10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating: E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating: II - Critical 
Risk Designation: Low 
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Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI0357 2. Revision: 01 3. Revision Date: 7/8/96 
4. Location: Main Drift 
5. Scenario Description: Personnel injury/equipment damage caused by a diesel fuel fire due to ignition by open 
flame or heating device in the presence of diesel fuel, hydraulic fluid, lubncating oil, flammable cleaning solvents, 
disposable clean-up matenals 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
• Diesel fuel leak 
• Trash fire 
• Welding/cutting or open flame 
* Space heaters or test equipment heating elements 
7. INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Consequence Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Initial Risk Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Venfication Required) 
Control cigarette smoking around diesel equipment and diesel fuel 
Control welding/cutting operations around diesel equipment, fuel tanks, and storage containers 
Employee training on the location of and proper use of fire extinguisher and alternate fire suppression 
methods for fighting diesel fires in its incipient stage 
Provide at least one portable (ABC) dry chemical fire extinguisher on all mobile diesel equipment 
Provide an automatic and/or manual fire suppression system for all mobile diesel equipment 
Diesel fuel tanks for mobile diesel equipment shall be made of metal at least 1/16 " thick welded at all 
seams and mounted in a position to preclude damage during use 
No separate or auxiliary fuel tank shall be attached on mobile diesel equipment 
Install a fire detection system, portable fire extinguisher, and water hose stations along the main dnft 
• Establish inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule, maintain inspection and maintenance 
records 
• Refuge chambers 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures 
• Employee safety training on fire hazards, proper personal protective equipment and the proper use of self 
rescuers 
b. Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements (I e , OSHA) 
Not Available/Not Completed 
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9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• NFPA 124, Diesel Fuel and Diesel Equipment in Underground Mines 
• NFPA 122, Standard for Storage of Flammable and Combustible Liquids Within Underground Metal and 
Non-Metal Mines 
• OSHA - 29 CFR 1926 Subpart S 
• Subsurface Fire Hazard Analysis, BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 Rev. 0 
• Subsurface Fire Protection Design Analysis, B ABFAHOOO-01717-0200-00114 Rev. 0 
• Subsurface Fire Protection, BABFAH000-01717-6300-15300 Rev. 0 
• Fire Alarm And Smoke Detector System, B ABBEBOOO-01717-6300-16721 Rev.O 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures.* 
• Maintenance, operations and housekeeping procedures. Inspection and maintenance records* 
*It is the constructor's and operator's responsibility to assure that the hazard(s) associated with this scenario 
have been mitigated through proper documentation. 
10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating: E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating: II - Critical 
Risk Designation: Low 
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Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI0358 2. Revision: 01 3. Revision Date: 7/8/96 
4. Location: Main Dnft 
5. Scenario Description: Personnel injury/equipment damage caused by diesel fire on diesel locomotive while 
transporting diesel fuel into tunnel 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
• Electrical or mechanical sparks in the presence of hydraulic fluid, lubricating oil, diesel fuel, flammable 
cleaning solvents, disposable clean up matenals 
• Runaway vehicle, failure to adhere to safety procedures 
INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Consequence Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Initial Risk Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Venfication Required) 
• Diesel fuel shall be stored in and transferred (into the tunnel) in approved containers 
• Diesel fuel shall not be transferred into the tunnel in the same conveyance with personnel 
• When diesel fuel is transferred into the tunnel, it shall be transferred directly to the storage area or location 
where it will be used 
• Operator training on the proper methods of handling diesel fuel and refueling of diesel equipment 
• Control cigarette smoking around diesel equipment and diesel fuel 
• Employee training on the location of and proper use of fire extinguisher and alternate fire suppression 
methods for fighting diesel fires in its incipient stage 
• Provide at least one portable (ABC) dry chemical fire extinguisher on all mobile diesel equipment 
• Provide an automatic and/or manual fire suppression system for all mobile diesel equipment 
• Install a fire detection system, portable fire extinguisher, and water hose stations along the main dnft 
• Establish inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule, maintain inspection and maintenance 
records 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures 
• Refuge chambers 
• Employee safety training on fire hazards, proper personal protective equipment and the proper use of self 
rescuers 
b. Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements (l e , OSHA) 
Not Available/Not Completed 
BABOOOOOO-01717-0200-00150 REV 00 B-16 December 2001 
9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• NFPA 124, Diesel Fuel and Diesel Equipment in Underground Mines 
• NFPA 122, Standard for Storage of Flammable and Combustible Liquids Within Underground Metal and 
Non-Metal Mines 
• OSHA - 29 CFR 1926 Subpart S 
• Subsurface Fire Hazard Analysis, B ABF AHOOO-01717-0200-00121 Rev. 0 
• Subsurface Fire Protection Design Analysis, BABFAHOOO-01717-0200-00114 Rev. 0 
• Subsurface Fire Protection, BABFAH000-01717-6300-15300 Rev.O 
• Fire Alarm And Smoke Detector System, B ABBEBOOO-01717-6300-16721 Rev.O 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures.* 
• Maintenance, operations and housekeeping procedures. Inspection and maintenance records* 
*It is the constructor's and operator's responsibility to assure that the hazard(s) associated with this scenario 
have been mitigated through proper documentation. 
10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating: E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating: II - Critical 
Risk Designation: Low 
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Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI0359 2. Revision: 01 3. Revision Date: 7/8/96 
4. Location: Main Dnft 
5. Scenario Description: Personnel injury/equipment damage caused by fire in diesel fuel storage area 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
• Electncal or mechanical sparks in the presence of hydraulic fluid, lubncating oil, diesel fuel, flammable 
cleaning solvents, disposable clean up matenals 
• Smoldenng ashes from cigarettes in the presence of hydraulic fluid, lubricating oil, diesel fuel, flammable 
cleaning solvents, disposable clean up matenals 
• Diesel fuel leak 
• Trash fire 
INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Consequence Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Initial Risk Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Venfication Required) 
• Diesel fuel shall be stored in and transferred (into the tunnel) in approved containers 
• Post safety/warning signs in diesel fuel storage areas 
• Control storage of diesel fuel away from electrical components (e g transformers, electncal panels), out of 
travelway of vehicular traffic, and at least 50 feet from explosives, shafts and shops 
• Control fuel sources (hydraulic fluid , lubricating oil (leak resistant seals in common use), diesel fuel, 
flammable cleaning solvents (prohibit use of solvents that by NFPA definitions can be classified as 
flammable), disposable clean up matenals), if combustible gasses are projected to be above 10% of lower 
flammable limit at any time during operation use combustible gas sensors 
• Control cigarette smoking around diesel equipment and diesel fuel 
• Employee training on the location of and proper use of fire extinguisher and alternate fire suppression 
methods for fighting diesel fires in its incipient stage 
• Install a fire detection system, portable fire extinguisher, and water hose stations along the main drift 
• Operator training on the proper methods of handling diesel fuel and refueling of diesel equipment 
• Establish inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule, maintain inspection and maintenance 
records 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures 
• Refuge chambers 
• Employee safety training on fire hazards, proper personal protective equipment and the proper use of self 
rescuers 
b. Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements (l e , OSHA) 
Not Available/Not Completed 
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9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• NFPA 124, Diesel Fuel and Diesel Equipment in Underground Mines 
• NFPA 122, Standard for Storage of Flammable and Combustible Liquids Within Underground Metal and 
Non-Metal Mines 
• OSHA - 29 CFR 1926 Subpart S 
• Subsurface Fire Hazard Analysis, BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 Rev. 0 
• Subsurface Fire Protection Design Analysis, BABFAH000-01717-0200-00114 Rev. 0 
• Subsurface Fire Protection, BABFAH000-01717-6300-15300 Rev.O 
• Fire Alarm And Smoke Detector System, BABBEB000-01717-6300-16721 Rev.O 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures.* 
• Maintenance, operations and housekeeping procedures. Inspection and maintenance records* 
*It is the constructor's and operator's responsibility to assure that the hazard(s) associated with this scenario 
have been mitigated through proper documentation. 
10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating: E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating: II - Critical 
Risk Designation: Low 
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Scenario Analysis Summary 
1. Scenario Number: UI0361 2. Revision: 01 3. Revision Date: 7/8/96 
4. Location: Main Dnft 
5. Scenario Description: Personnel injury/equipment damage caused by a diesel fuel fire due to diesel fuel leak 
from fuel tank 
6. Cause, Failure, or Hazardous Event: 
Diesel fuel spill or leak on hot surfaces (e g , engine exhaust, brakes, worn beanngs) 
Diesel fuel tank leak caused by age/rust or wear 
Diesel fuel leak due to failure of mechanical joint 
Human error (e g puncturing diesel fuel tank) 
Diesel fuel leak during refueling of diesel equipment 
7. INITIAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Consequence Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
Initial Risk Rating Not Available/Not Completed 
8. a. Required Mitigation/Control Features: (Implementation and Venfication Required) 
• Control electncal sparking (use appropnate codes and regulations) 
• Control cigarette smoking around diesel equipment and diesel fuel 
• Control welding/cutting operation around diesel fuel tanks/containers 
• Provide at least one portable (ABC) dry chemical fire extinguisher on all mobile diesel equipment 
• Employee training on the location of and proper use of fire extinguisher and alternate fire suppression 
methods for fighting diesel fires in its incipient stage 
• Provide an automatic and/or manual fire suppression system for all mobile diesel equipment 
• Diesel fuel tanks for mobile diesel equipment shall be made of metal at least 1/16 " thick welded at all 
seams and mounted in a position to preclude damage during use 
• No separate or auxiliary fuel tank shall be attached on mobile diesel equipment 
• Install a fire detection system, portable fire extinguisher, and water hose stations along the main drift 
• Operator training on the proper methods of handling diesel fuel and refueling of diesel equipment 
• Establish inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule, maintain inspection and maintenance 
records 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures 
• Refuge chambers 
• Employee safety training on fire hazards, proper personal protective equipment and the proper use of self 
rescuers 
b. Defense-in-Depth Mitigation/Control Features: Implementation not required by the SSA to reach the 
Final Risk Rating NOTE May be required to satisfy other regulatory requirements (I e , OSHA) 
Not Available/Not Completed 
BABOOOOOO-01717-0200-00150 REV 00 B-20 December 2001 
9. Mitigation Documentation: 
• NFPA 124, Diesel Fuel and Diesel Equipment in Underground Mines 
• NFPA 122, Standard for Storage of Flammable and Combustible Liquids Within Underground Metal and 
Non-Metal Mines 
• OSHA - 29 CFR 1926 Subpart S 
• Subsurface Fire Hazard Analysis, BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 Rev 0 
• Subsurface Fire Protection Design Analysis, BABFAHOOO-01717-0200-00114 Rev 0 
• Subsurface Fire Protection, BABFAH000-01717-6300-15300 Rev 0 
• Fire Alarm And Smoke Detector System, B ABBEBOOO-01717-6300-16721 Rev 0 
• Emergency evacuation plan and procedures * 
• Maintenance, operations and housekeeping procedures Inspection and maintenance records* 
*It is the constructor's and operator's responsibility to assure that the hazard(s) associated with this scenario 
have been mitigated through proper documentation 
10. FINAL Hazard Classification: 
Frequency Rating E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating II - Cntical 
Risk Designation Low 
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